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CASENOTES
Absolute Veterans' Preference in Public Employment: Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney '—Traditionally, as a reward for their service to this
country, veterans 2 have enjoyed preferential treatment in public civil service
employment.' Most states and the federal government grant veterans who
pass the civil service examinations a limited, initial hiring preference. 4 The
two forms most commonly offered are either a point preference !' or a tie-
breaking preference." These preferences give eligible veterans a competitive
head start over eligible non-veterans by increasing their composite test. scores.
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
2 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 43 (West 1976) provides Mas-
sachusetts's general definition of the term veteran as quoted here in pertinent part:
"Veteran" shall mean any person, male or female, including a nurse,
(a) whose last discharge or release from his wartime service, as defined
herein, was under honorable conditions and who (b) served in the army,
navy, marine corps, coast guard, or air force of the United States fir not
less than ninety clays active service, at least one day of which was for war-
time service, provided, that any person who so served in wartime and was
awarded a service-connected disability or a Purple Heart, or who died in
such service under conditions other than dishonorable, shall be deemed to
be a veteran notwithstanding his failure to complete ninety days of active
service.
Id. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 31, § 21 (West 1976) adds to the general definition
provided in chapter 4:
The word "veteran" as used in this chapter shall mean: any citizen
who—
(a) Is a veteran as defined in clause Forty-third of section seven of
chapter four, or (b) meets all the requirements of said clause Forty-third
except that instead of performing wartime service as so defined he has
been awarded one of the campaign badges enumerated in this section, or
has been awarded the congressional medal of honor.
Id.
3 See. Blumberg, De Facto and De Jure Sex Discrimination Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: A Reconsideration of the Veterans' Preference in Public Employment, 26 BUFFALO
L. REV. 3 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Blumberg]. Many states adopted veterans'
employment preferences as early as the period between the Civil War and World War
I. More recently, states have added education, counseling, and unemployment benefits
to their legislative scheme of rewarding veterans. An important characteristic of these
later benefits is that their entire cost is spread among all of the taxpayers. The burden
of providing employment preferences, however, is borne by the one individual who
would have been granted the civil service position but for the preference. Id. at 7-9.
4 See Fleming & Shanor, Veterans' Preference in Public Employment: Unconstitu-
tional Gender Discrimination?, 26 EMORY L.J. 13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fleming &
Shanor]. All states and the federal government offer veterans preferences in public
employment. These preferences are characterized as either initial hiring preferences,
promotional preferences, or lay off preferences. Id. at 16. The initial hiring prefer-
ence, by far the most common form granted, is provided by approximately forty-seven
states. See id. at 16-17 n.1 I.
Approximately forty states provide veterans point preferences in public
employme nt. See id. at 17 n.12 for a list of states and statute citations.
At least seven states provide a tie-breaking preference either in place of or
in addition to point preferences. See id. at 17 n.14.
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Under the point preference, for instance, five or ten points are added to each
veteran's score.' Similarly, under the tie-breaking preference, a veteran's test
results are deemed higher than identical scores achieved by non-veterans. 8
Unlike the point or tie-breaking techniques, however, the Massachusetts
veterans' preference" is limited neither in its form nor in its effect. The Mas-
sachusetts preference is both permanent, in that veterans may utilize it re-
peatedly throughout their lives, and absolute, in that it automatically places all
eligible veterans ahead of any eligible non-veterans regardless of their compo-
site test scores." Specifically, the Massachusetts Veterans' Preference Stat-
ute' ranks the eligible applicants by a status formula. First, disabled veterans
are ranked at the top in order of their composite test scores." Other veterans
7 The federal government adds five bonus points to each veteran's test score
and ten points to each disabled veteran's test result. See Blumberg, supra note 3, at 3
n.l. While some states utilize this same "five-ten" plan, others offer veterans ten bonus
points and grant disabled veterans fifteen extra points. Id. at 4 n.4.
" See Fleming & Shanor, supra note 4, at 17.
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 31, § 23 (West recodified 1978). On January 1,
1979, after the Feeney litigation was commenced, the Massachusetts civil service law was
recodified. 1978 Mass. Acts ch. 393, § 11. Currently, the Massachusetts preference is
found at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 26. For accuracy, all references in this
casenote to the Massachusetts veterans' preference are to MASS. GEN. Laws ANN. ch .
31 as it existed prior to its recodification.
19 See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 499 (D. Mass. 1976), ques-
tion certified sub. nom. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976), question answered,
373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977), vacated, 434 U.S. 884 (1977). affd, 451 F.
Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 439 U.S. 891 (1978), rev'd, 440 U.S. 250
(1979), acq., 475 F. Supp. 109 (D. Mass. 1979).
" MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 31, § 23 (West recodified 1978) provides in full:
The names of persons who pass examinations for appointment to any
position classified under the civil service shall be placed upon the eligible
lists in the following order:—
(1) Disabled veterans as defined in section twenty-three A, in the order
of their respective,standing; (2) veterans in the order of their respective
standing; (3) persons described in section twenty-three in the order of their
respective standing; (4) other applicants in the order of their respective
standing. Upon receipt of a requisition, names shall be certified from such
lists according to the method of certification prescribed by the civil service
rules. A disabled veteran shall be retained in employment in preference to
all other persons, including veterans.
Id. The actual procedure for obtaining a civil service appointment under the Mas-
sachusetts statute is as follows. Massachusetts civil service positions arc categorized as
either classified official service or classified labor service. Since the appointments which
plaintiff sought were in the classified labor service, she was required to take a written
examination administered by the state Civil Service Division. The aim of this examina-
tion is to measure an applicant's qualifications. These test results are combined in an
evaluation of each individual's training and experience to determine each applicant's
composite test score. Once an applicant passes this test and receives a composite test
score, (s)he becomes an "eligible" and is placed on an eligible list. Applicants on the
eligible list are ranked not purely by their composite test scores, but by the preference
statute's absolute ranking formula. When a position opens within the Civil Service,
candidates from the top of this list are certified for appointment. See Anthony v. Mas-
sachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 488.
12 The term "disabled veteran" is defined at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 31, §
23A (West recodified 1978).
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are ranked thereafter, followed by widows and widowed mothers of veter-
ans.'" Finally, all other eligibles are ranked, each in order of their respective
composite test scores."
The operation of this ranking formula prevents any non-veteran from
ever being placed ahead of a lower scoring veteran.'' In contrast with the
point and tie-breaking preferences, which preserve the evaluative function of
the civil service examinations by simply adjusting veterans' scores," the Mas-
sachusetts absolute preference supplants this role by elevating veteran status
completely over test results." Further, as long as the number of applicants
exceeds the available civil service positions, this absolute preference makes the
veteran status a job requirement, not simply a preferred characteristic.' For
these reasons, the Massachusetts absolute veterans' preference has been sub-
ject to numerous constitutional challenges.'"
" Widows and widowed mothers of veterans are included in the definition of
"other persons" as provided by MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 23B (West recodilied
978).
11 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 31, § 23. See note 11 supra.
15 Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 497. In delivering the lower
court's opinion, Judge Tauro observed that the "practical effect of the Veterans' Pref-
erence is clear. Eligible veterans, regardless of qualifications relative to eligible non-
veterans, have the public employment field cleared for them on an absolute and per-
manent basis." Id.
" As stated in note 11 supra, the composite test score is a combination of the
applicant's numerical results on the civil service examination and an evaluation of the
applicant's job qualifications. By merely increasing this composite test score, the evalua-
tive function is still preserved since the composite test score itself is not disregarded.
" Anthony v. Massachusetts, 4l5 F. Supp. at 488-89. The Massachusetts stat-
ute ranks eligible applicants primarily by their status and only secondarily by their test
results. This factor caused Judge Tauro to observe that "as a practical matter, there-
fore, the Veterans' Preference replaces testing as the criterion for determining which
eligibles will be placed at the top of the list." Id.
'" See Blumberg. supra note 3, at 3 n.3. Professor Blumberg observed that,
"The veteran does not merely step in line ahead of the non-veteran to assume one of
an endless stream of jobs. When eligible applicants exceed openings ... previous mili-
tary experience is effectively a 'job requirement.' " Id.
1 " See, e.g., Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361 Mass. 480, 281 N.E.2d 53
(1972) (describing the troubled history of the Massachusetts veterans' preference);
Mayor of Lynn v. Commissioner of Civil Serv., 269 Mass. 410, 169 NE. 502 (1929)
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopting the Opinion of the Justices, 166
Mass. 589, 44 N.E. 625 (1896), where a majority of four justices declared that it was
constitutional to absolutely prefer veterans who pass civil service examinations over all
male non-veterans); Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 N.E. 1005 (1896) (holding
unconstitutional St. 1895, ch. 501, §§ 2, 6, making the appointment of veterans to the
detective force compulsory without examination),
For cases involving challenges to veterans' preferences in states other than Mas-
sachusetts, see Ballou v. State Dept of Civil Serv., 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2cl 1118 (1978)
(absolute preference held not to discriminate against women in violation of the equal
protection clause); Branch v. DuBois, 418 F. Stipp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (point prefer-
ence held not to discriminate against women in violation of the equal protection
clause); Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Stipp. 252 (N1.D. Pa. 1973) (sustaining validity of
point preference): Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (1). Minn. 1972) (sustaining
validity of initial absolute hiring preference and "5-point" promotional preference).
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Helen B. Feeney, a female resident of the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts and a non-veteran, 2 " began her 12-year tenure in the Massachusetts
Civil Defense Agency in 1963 as a Senior Clerk Stenographer.''' In 1967, she
gained an inter-agency promotion to the position of Federal Funds and Per-
sonnel Coordinator. 22 Between 1971 and 1974, to secure a better job, Mrs.
Feeney took three written civil service examinations. 23 On the first test. she
received the second highest score, but was placed sixth behind five male vet-
erans, four of whom had lower scores.' 4 Similarly, in 1973, although achiev-
ing the third highest score, she was listed fourteenth, behind twelve male vet-
erans, eleven of whom had lower scores. 25 Finally, in 1974, although tied for
seventeenth place, Mrs. Feeney was ranked seventieth behind sixty-four vet-
erans, sixty-three of whom were male, forty-nine having lower scores. 21' But
for the Massachusetts veterans' preference, Mrs. Feeney, by virtue of her high
scores, would have been considered for appointment.'' Because of the stat-
ute's operation, however, each time she was ranked behind lower scoring vet-
erans, and thus out of the competition.
Contending that the absolute preference formula operated to systemati-
cally exclude eligible women from consideration for upper-level civil service
positions, Mrs. Feeney 28 brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 2 " in the
211 Although Mrs. Feeney never formally applied for entry into the armed
forces, she did inquire, at age eighteen about enlistment. She was told that females
under twenty-one needed parental consent to join the military, whereas similarly
situated males did not. Since Mrs. Feeney's mother refused to give her consent, plain-
tiff was unable to join. See Affidavit of Helen B. Feeney at 8, United States District
Court for the District of' Massachusetts, Civil Action No. 75-1991-T, compiled at page
180 in Appendix, Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1978. No. 78-
233.
21 Mrs. Feeney had worked for fourteen years in the private sector before
becoming a public servant. 442 U.S. at 264.
22 Id.
23 Anthony v. Massachusetts, 45! F. Stipp. at 492. In 1971 plaintiff completed
the examination for Assistant Secretary, Board of Dental Examiners, In 1973, she took
the test for the position of Head Administrative Assistant. Finally, in 1974, plaintiff
took the examination for an Administrative Assistant's position. Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
2 " Id.
27 Id. Because of a temporary restraining order entered by judge Tauro on
May 23, 1975, no appointments were made 10 the position of Administrative Assistant
while the original action was pending. Id. at 487-88. Following the district court's initial
decision, see text and note at note 36 infra, Massachusetts suspended MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch . 31, § 23 and adopted an interim veterans' point preference statute. 1976
Mass. Acts ch. 200, § 1 (Supp. 1978-1979).
2" In the original case, Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass.
1976), plaintiffs included Mrs. Feeney and three female, Massachusetts resident attor-
neys: Carol A. Anthony, Kathryn Noonan, and Betty A. Ones. The female attorneys'
claims were rendered moot by an amendment 10 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 31, § 5
providing: "No rule made by the [Civil Service] commission shall apply to the follow-
ing: ... counsels, attorneys-at-law, including attorneys designated as counsel or
counsellors-at-law, city solicitors, town counsels, and assistant town counsels." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 31, § 48, added by 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 134. 442 U.S. at 259 n.30.
2 " 42 U.S.C. 1983 (197(i) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any state ... subjects ... any citizen of the United
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United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.'" The Mas-
sachusetts Civil Service Commission and the Director of Civil Service were
named as defendants.'" Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the Massachusetts
absolute veterans' preference discriminated against her in the area of public
employment on the basis of gender in violation of both the equal protection
and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Cot ist itu tion." 2
Mrs. Feeney asserted that the exclusionary impact of the statute's opera-
tion should be measured in combination with the pre-existing military regula-
tions and quotas, which have severely limited the number of women who
could enter the armed forces." 3
 Thus, she argued, since only 2% of Mas-
States or other person ... to the deprivation of any rights
	 secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
of law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. Plaintiff was precluded front bringing an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000c-17 (1976), since section 2000e-11 of that
Act provides that INlothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal
or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating special rights or prefer-
ence for veterans."
" Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976).
'" The original defendants included the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the
Division of Civil Service, the Director of the Civil Service, and the Massachusetts Civil
Service Commission. Both the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the Division of
Civil Service were found not to be "persons" within the meaning of § 1983, and the
case was dismissed as to them. Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 487 n.2.
After this litigation commenced, the office of the Director of the Civil Service was
eliminated and its responsibilities were assigned to the Personnel Administrator of the
Commonwealth. 1974 Mass. Acts ch. 835, §§ 51, 57-65.
32
 Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 490, 499 n.15. See also Com-
plaint, Anthony v. Massachusetts, at 11 45, United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts, C.A. No. 75-1991-T, compiled at p. 56 in, Appendix, Supreme
Court of the United States, October Term, 1978, No. 78-233.
33
 In 1948, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, 62 Stat. 356-75,
gave permanent status to women in the four services. The law, however, set a 2%
quota on the number of women who could enter the armed forces. See 10 U.S.C. §§
3209, 3215, 5410, 8208, 8215, repealed by Act of November 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
130, §§ 1(19)(E), 1(9)(H), 1(16), 1(26)(C), I (26)(E), (F). In 1967, Public Law 90-130
lifted the 1948 quota. The Army, however, continued to maintain a 2% limit by regu-
lation until 1978. 32 C.F.R. § 580.4(b), repealed by Pub, L. No. 95-485, § 820, 92 Stat.
1627.
In addition to this initial entry limitation, women have been subjected to more
stringent enlistment and advancement requirements than have similarly situated men.
See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 489. While men could enlist at age
seventeen, women were barred until age eighteen. Id. Men were free to enlist without
parental consent after age eighteen, while women were required to have their parents'
permission until age twenty-one. Id. at 489-90. Women were subjected to higher men-
tal aptitude tests and more strenuous physical tests than were men. Id. Women with
minor children were prohibited from enlisting. Id. Women have also been restricted to
a top rank of lieutenant colonel. See generally Landrum & Zanica, Women in the Military,
5 WOMEN'S WORK 17, 17 (Sept.-Oct. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Landrum & Zanica].
While many of these restrictions may have operated to prevent or discourage plaintiff
front enlisting in the armed forces, see note 20 supra, the 2% ceiling on female per-
sonnel within the military was never reached. Landrum & Zanica, supra.
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sachusens women could ever attain the preferred veteran status, the prefer-
ence statute excluded most women from the best civil service positions."
Plaintiff sought to permanently enjoin the continued enforcement of this ab-
solute preference formula."'
A special three-judge session of the United States District Court. for the
District of Massachusetts recognized the worthy state purpose of assisting vet-
erans, but found that the absolute ranking formula, controlled as it was by the
federal military enrollment policies, permanently foreclosed the public
employment opportunities of most women and thereby deprived them of
equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment." The
Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, under the author-
ity of stale law, appealed this decision directly to the United States Supreme
Court without the consent and over the express objections of the defen-
dants."' The Court, without opinion, vacated the federal district court's
judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the interven-
ing decision of Washington v. Davis." Under Davis," a facially neutral statute
is not unconstitutional solely because of its disproportionate impact:m On re-
" Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 490. Plaintiff limited her chal-
lenge to the "best civil service positions" since women, in fact, have access to lower-
level, lower-paying civil service jobs. This result is partially caused by a now defunct.
procedure of requesting only women for these positions, and partially produced by the
fact that few men apply for these secretarial and clerk jobs. M. at 488. See note 49
infra. -
'' Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 487.
" Id. at 499. Judge Campbell filed a concurring opinion in which he em-
phasized the limited reach of the court's holding. According to judge Campbell, a state
may enact a more limited hiring preference which merely gives the veteran applicants
"credit and even a headstart over other jobseekers." The absolute means by which
Massachusetts rewards its veterans, however, "goes too far" since it also permanently
excluded "women from a major sector of employment." Id. at 501 (Campbell, J., con-
curring). judge Murray dissented from the court's holding since he found that the
"Commonwealth's choice of means to implement the purpose [of rewarding veterans]
does not invidiously discriminate against women." Id. at 507 (Murray, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
27
 Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 361, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1264
(1977). Two days after the lower court's decision was issued, the Massachusetts Civil
Service Commission voted to ask the Attorney General not to appeal. Id. The Person-
nel Administrator also opposed the appeal. Id. The Massachusetts legislature, however,
urged the Attorney General to continue. Id. When the Attorney General filed notice of
appeal with the United Stales Supreme Court, these nominal defendants advised the
Court of their opposition. 1d. The Court subsequently certified a question of state law
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, asking whether Massachusetts law au-
thorized the Attorney General to appeal over the express objections of the defendants.
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 429 U.S. 66 (1976). The Supreme Judicial Court answered
the question affirmatively, Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 368, 366 N.E.2d
1262, 1267 (1977), and the Attorney General appealed directly to the United States
Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253. 442 U.S. at 261.
"8
 434 U.S. 884 (1977).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
4 " Id. at 244 -45. Note that in Davis the alleged discrimination was racial. The
importance of this is discussed in text and notes at notes 190-218 infra.
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mancl, the district court, with one judge concurring and one judge dissenting,
reaffirmed its prior holding, finding that the Massachusetts legislature had
intentionally sacrificed the employment opportunities of women in order to
benefit its veterans.'
The Attorney General again appealed to the United States Supreme
Coml.'''. A seven justice majority reversed, remanded, and HELD: An abso-
lute lifetime veterans' preference does not discriminate against women in vio-
lation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment:" In
reaching this decision, the Court initially determined that the Massachusetts
preference statute was gender-neutral in that it distinguished not between
men and women, but merely between veterans and non-veterans." The
Court also held that no discrimin a tory purpose had shaped the veterans'
preference legislation In a dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall, joined by
Justice Brennan, argued that Massachusetts' choice of an absolute preference
did evidence purposeful gender discrimination in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fOurteenth amendment.'"
The significance of the Feeney decision is twofold. Feeney is the first case
Following Washington v. Davis in which the Court has considered the constitu-
tionality of a facially new ral statute  which results in a disproportionate impact
on women rather than on a racial group. Hence, in applying the Davis hold-
ing to Feeney, the Court established that gender discrimination cases based on
disproportionate impact claims will be subject to the same discriminatory pur-
pose requirement previously applied only in race discrimination cases. Second,
in differentiating allowable from unconstitutional legislative motivation, the
Feeney Court explicitly defined the level of intent required under Davis's pur-
poseful discrimination standard. In defining discriminatory intent, however,
the Court. avoided deciding whether a state legislature can knowingly and
needlessly sacrifice the employment opportunities of one identifiable group in
order to grant preferential treatment to another.
This casenote first will discuss the Court's treatment of the Feeney case.
Next, a critique of the Court's analytical approach will be offered. A close
analysis of the steps necessary in uncovering the existence of a covert classifi-
cation will demonstrate that the Feeney Court. misformulated and misapplied
its two-step inquiry. The application of the Washington v. Davis decision to
Feeney will be considered next. It will be submitted that the Court inappro-
'" Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 150 (D. Mass. 1978). Judge
Campbell filed a concurring opinion in which he asserted that the Massachusetts vet-
erans' statute did not actually "fall within libel ambit" of the Davis decision, since the
preference was not truly gender-neutral. Id. at 150-51 (Campbell, J., concurring).
Judge Murray, dissenting from the court's holding, argued that the veterans' statute
was neutral, and that its enactment was not motivated by a legislative intent to harm
women. Id. at 152-53 (Murray, J., dissenting). Under this analysis, Judge Murray
would have sustained the Massachusetts veterans' preference. Id. at 156.
" The Attorney General appealed pursuant. to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the
Court noted probable jurisdiction. 439 U.S. 891 (1978).
4[3
	U.S. at 271-81.
" Id. at 275.
45 Id. ai 280.
" Id. at 281-82 (Marshall and Brennan, D., dissenting).
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priately extended Davis's discriminatory purpose standard to the issue of gen-
der discrimination involved in Feeney. Finally, the Court's definition of the
level of intent that is required to satisfy Davis's discriminatory purpose stan-
dard will be discussed. After examining the special facts of Feeney, it will be
suggested that the Court should have included within its definition of dis-
criminatory intent legislative disregard concerning the occurrence of discrimi-
nation, as well as positive legislative desire to discriminate.
I. THE SUPREME. COURT'S ANALYSIS IN EENEY
A. The Majority's Analytical Approach
Guided by two prior race discrimination cases,' 7
 the Feeney majority
reasoned that since the Massachusetts veterans' preference was neutral on its
face" but disproportionate in its impact on women, 4" a two-step inquiry was
necessary.'" Under this approach, the Court first considered whether the
statutory classification was indeed both overtly and covertly gender-neutral.''
If so held, the Court would then determine whether the adverse effect of the
statute reflected invidious gender discrintination." 2
1. First Inquiry: Overt or Covert. Classification
In considering whether the Massachusetts act established an overt or
covert classification, the Court questioned whether the distinction between
veterans and non-veterans drawn by the language of the statute was a mere
pretext for gender discrimination.'' In answering this question, the Court
initially relied upon two admissions by the plaintiff:" Noting Mrs. Feeney's
47
 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (a neutral law's disproportionate
impact must be traced to an underlying purpose to discriminate); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (reaffirmed Davis's
discriminatory purpose standard; suggested an objective method of proving the exis-
tence of purposeful discrimination).
48
 The Massachusetts veterans' preference was deemed facially neutral because
the language of the statute distinguishes only between veterans and non-veterans. 442
U.S. at 274-75.
49
 Between 1963 and 1973, while Mrs. Feeney was involved in the civil service
selection system, 47,005 appointments were made. Of this total, 26,794 (57%) were
men and 20,211 (43%) were women. Of these appointees, 14,476 (54%) of the men
were veterans, while only 374 (1.8%) of the women had veteran status. Anthony v.
Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 488. While this 57%-43% ratio seems fairly equal, it is
misleading in that it does not describe the actual impact which was at the heart of the
plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff contended that the absolute veterans' preference operated to
exclude women from the best civil service positions, not from all civil service jobs. See
note 34 supra. Thus, as the district court found, the more revealing comparison is
between the lower-level and upper-level appointments. "Female appointees arc gener-
ally clerks and secretaries, lower-grade and lower-paying positions for which men tra-
ditionally have not applied. Few, if any, females have ever been considered for the
higher positions in the state Civil Service." Id. at 498.
s° 442 U.S. at 274.
51 Id.
52 Id.
3 Id. at 274.
" Id.
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concession that the Massachusetts veterans' law was neutral on its face, the
Court seemed to imply that the statutory classification was itself overtly
gender-neutral. 55 Further, the Court stated that since the plaintiff had lim-
ited her constitutional challenge to the absolute form of the Massachusetts
veterans' preference, she implicitly had acknowledged that other types of vet-
erans' preferences were valid.'''
Finding therefore that the overt classification made by the Massachusetts
preference was gender-neutral, and reasoning that other states' limited hiring
preferences were not automatically invalid, the Court narrowed the question
before it to whether Massachusetts' choice of an absolute and permanent
preference was a pretext for gender-based discrimination.'' Determining that.
no such pretext existed, the Court emphasized two central findings of the
district court. 58 The lower court had found that. the veterans' preference
served worthy and legitimate purposes. •  More specifically, the district court
had determined that. the absolute preference had not been enacted for the
purpose of discriminating against women." The Feeney Court reasoned that
both the plaintiff's concessions and the district court's findings dictated the
conclusion that the distinction drawn by the Massachusetts veterans' statute
was not. a pretext for gender-based discrimination."
Turning from classification to impact, the Court supported this conclu-
sion by demonstrating that the act's adverse effect on women could be
explained on neutral grounds. 62 Initially, the Court noted that the statutory
definition of the terns "veteran" was itself gender-neutral."" More impor-
tantly, the Court stated that Massachusetts had consistently defined veteran
status to include women who had served in the military." Hence, the Court
observed that the actual veteran class was not uniquely male, nor was the
non-veteran class completely female," In fact, the Court emphasized, too
many male non-veterans are themselves disadvantaged by the preference
to allow explaining the statute as simply a pretext for preferring men over
women." Instead, reasoned the Court, the correct explanation of the statute's
5 Id. at 274-75.
5" Id. at 274.
57 Id. at 274-85.
58
 Id. at 274.
5" Id.; Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. at 496.
442 U.S. at 274; 415 F. Supp. at 495.
"' 442 U.S. at 274-75.
12 Id. at 275.
"3 Id. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 43 defines the term "veteran" as
"any person, male or female ...."
" 442 U.S. at 275. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 21A provides a definition
of persons having veteran status.
"5 442 U.S. at 275.
Id. Here, the Court has caught itself in a statistical inconsistency. By em-
phasizing that the veteran class is not uniquely male, the Court places great signifi-
cance on the 2% of the armed forces personnel which is female. Yet by stressing that
men, as a group, are significantly disadvantaged by the preference, the Court places
little importance on the fact that 47% of Massachusetts men are veterans, whereas only
0.8% of Massachusetts women have veteran status. See 442 U.S. at 286 n.3 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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adverse impact is not that women are excluded from civil service positions
because they are females, but because they are non-veterans."'
Shifting again from impact to purpose, the Court suggested that the stat-
ute's worthy goal provided the surest vindication of its adverse impact on
women." The Court reasoned that even though "impact alone can [at times]
unmask an invidious classification," the legitimate purpose of rewarding vet-
erans, by itself, excluded the possibility that a gender classification was con-
cealed within the Massachusetts preference statute." The Court concluded
that the statute simply distinguished between veterans and non-veterans, not
between men and women. 7() Having dispensed with this initial analysis, the
Court next considered the more crucial question posed by its two-fold
inquiry—whether the adverse effect of the veterans' preference act reflected
invidious gender discrimination...11
2. Second Inquiry: Existence of Purposeful Gender Discrimination
Assured that the Massachusetts absolute veterans' preference did not
contain a gender classification, the Court turned to the heart of its analysis
and evaluated the statute in accordance with its holding in Washington v.
Davis. 72
 In Davis, the Court announced that a neutral statute could not be
deemed unconstitutional solely because of its disproportionate impact.'• In-
stead, the Court developed a purposeful discrimination standard, requiring
that a law's disparate results be traced to an actual purpose to discriminate
against the group adversely affected. 74 In evaluating whether a gender-based
discriminatory purpose had so influenced the Massachusetts preference legis-
lation, the Court considered two arguments advanced by the plaintiff. One
concerned the inherently non-neutral nature of the preference; '' the other
focused on the inevitability of the statute's exclusionary impact on women. 7 "
Based in part tin Judge Campbell's concurring opinion in the district
court's decision, 77 plaintiff argued that the inherent nature of the veterans'
preference distinguished it front the truly neutral law before the Davis
Court." The veterans" preference statute, according to the plaintiff, was
structurally gender-biased because it benefitted a pre-established group, de-
fined by the federal military enrollment quota to be 98% male." In the view
"7 Id. at 275.
68 Id .
69 a
711 Id.
71 Id. at 276.
72
 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
73
 Id. at 244.
74 Id. at 245-47.
75
 442 U.S. at 276.
7" Id.
77 Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. at 151 (Campbell, J., concurring).
" 442 U.S. at 276.
7" Brief for the Appellee at 31, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). This portion of plaintiff's argument actually involves the
issue whether Massachusetts veterans' preference establishes a covert classification, the
issue considered by the Court in its initial inquiry. See text and notes at notes 176-86
infra.
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of Judge Campbell, the military's dividing line between 98% men and 2%
women was "built in" to the Massachusetts preference legislation,"" a factor
sufficient to remove the statute from the scope of the Davis opinion."
The Supreme Court rejected both the plaintiff's contention and Judge
Campbell's conclusion.B 2
 Although recognizing that the veterans' preference
was by design not neutral, the Court viewed the statute as being biased simply
in favor of veterans, upon whom it conferred a "deserved ... competitive
head start." H3
 Having found this goal to be valid, and the basic distinction
between veterans and non-veterans to be legitimate, the Feeney Court con-
cluded that the Massachusetts veterans' preference was not sufficiently distin-
guishable from the neutral law in Davis to merit a different treatment."
Having reaffirmed its position that the veterans' statute must be analyzed
under Davis's purposeful discrimination standard, the Court next considered
plaintiff's alternative argument, which again was based on the inherent struc-
ture of the preference legislation."' In plaintiff's view, even if the non-neutral
design of the veterans' preference were insufficient to distinguish it from
Davis, the deliberate incorporation of the military's discriminatory policies into
the veterans' act evinced purposeful gender discrimination attributable to the
Massachusetts legislature." The Feeney Court rejected plaintiff's incorpora-
tion argument for three reasons. While recognizing that two of its prior cases
had acknowledged that certain military procedures may well have been uncon-
stitutional," the Court emphasized that the military's alleged discrimination
" Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. at 151 (Campbell, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 150-51.
82
 442 U.S. at 276.
83 Id. The Court noted that the Massachusetts statute was "unusual" in that by
overtly preferring veterans it was designed to be non-neutral. Id. This partiality, recog-
nized the Court, made the Massachusetts statute technically different than the truly
neutral personnel test at issue in the Davis case. 426 U.S. at 245-46. Since the Mas-
sachusetts law was biased simply in favor of veterans, and not in favor of men, how-
ever, the Court determined that Davis was controlling. 442 U.S. at 277-78.
84
 442 U.S. at 277-78.
85
 Id. at 276.
" Brief for Appellee at 31, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256. This portion of plaintiff's argument more clearly involves the
question central to the Court's second inquiry, whether the adverse effect of the vet-
erans' statute reflects invidious gender discrimination. Compare text and note at note
79 supra, where plaintiff uses the inherently non-neutral argument to allege that the
veterans' law contains a gender classification.
"a
	 Frontier() v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a majority of the Court
struck down an Air Force statute which required servicewomen to demonstrate that
their husbands were dependent upon them for over one-half their support before the
servicewomen could qualify for certain allowances and benefits. Servicemen, on the
other hand, were not required to establish the dependency of their spouses in order to
qualify for these fringe benefits. In declaring this statute unconstitutional, the Court
held that male and female members of the armed forces could not be accorded differ-
ent treatment solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience. Id. at
690-91. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), the Court, however, upheld a
statute which provided female naval officers a thirteen year period to attain tenure,
while male naval officers were given only nine years. Instead, noting the Navy's histor-
ical restrictions on the opportunities of female officers, the Court reasoned that the
statute was an attempt to offer Navy women "fair and equitable career advancement
program[s]." Id. at 508.
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against women was not on trial in the Feeney case." Further, the Court stated,
any presumption that the Massachusetts legislature had intentionally incorpo-
rated existing military gender-based practices into its veterans' act was rebut-
ted by the district court's finding that the state had not established the prefer-
ence for the purpose of discriminating against women."" Moreover, the Court
stressed, the plaintiff's claim of discriminatory incorporation was inconsistent
with her concession that a more limited hiring preference was permissible."
Discriminatory intent, said the Court, is not measured by degree, but rather
by the fact that it exists at all.• Thus, the Court reasoned, if a discriminatory
desire had influenced the legislative choice, it would have affected the Mas-
sachusetts preference legislation from the outset, and the subsequent form of
that preference, whether absolute or limited, would make no constitutional
difference."'
Apart from identifying these problems with the plaintiff's argument, the
Court criticized the district court's superficial analysis of the issue. 93 On re-
mand, the lower court had been instructed to examine the cause of the stat-
ute's adverse impact on women in light of Davis, not merely to reconsider the
effect of that cause. 94 The district court's reaffirmation of its finding that the
veterans' preference was not enacted for the purpose of discriminating against
women was, in the Court's opinion, a correct beginning." But to reason from
that initial conclusion to a finding of purposeful discrimination because the
statute was inherently non-neutral was, in the Court's view, not only illogical,
but unsupported. 9" Such an analysis, stressed the Court, merely restated the
fact of the statute's adverse impact without ever evaluating whether a dis-
criminatory purpose had produced that result." Dissatisfied with the lower
court's insufficient analysis, the Feeney Court next considered the plaintiff's
assertion that such a discriminatory purpose should be inferred from the
awareness of the Massachusetts legislators that the absolute veterans' prefer-
ence would foreclose the public employment opportunities of most women."
In her final and most convincing attempt to establish the existence of
purposeful discrimination, Mrs. Feeney asserted that the statute's adverse im-
pact on women was too inevitable to have been unintended. 99 Specifically, she
argued that the legislature should be held to have intended the necessary and
8 8 442 U.S. at 278.
89 Id.
9° Id.
91
 Id. at 277.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See text and notes at notes 38-40 supra.
95 442 U.S. at 277. The Court stated that this finding by itself compelled the
conclusion that Massachusetts had "intended nothing more than to prefer 'veterans'."
Id,
" Id.
97 Id.
" Id. at 278.
99 Id.
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foreseeable consequences of its actions.'" In the plaintiff's view, the statute's
exclusionary impact on the job opportunities of women was sufficiently
foreseeable to impute a discriminatory intent to the Massachusetts legisla-
ture.'"
Although the validity of inferring a discriminatory purpose from such
objective evidence had been acknowledged previously, 102 the Feeney Court. re-
jected the plaintiff's inevitability argument. Apparently concerned that such
foreseeability considerations could be more misleading than probative, the
Court explicitly defined the level of intent required under Davis's purposeful
discrimination standard.'°3
 Initially, the Court acknowledged that the statute's
adverse impact was foreseeable and intended in that the Massachusetts legisla-
ture knowingly chose a method of benefitting veterans that also disadvantaged
women. '° In the Court's view, however, purposeful discrimination entails
more than an awareness of the probable consequences of a legislative
choice.'" Rather, the Court emphasized, it implies that the legislature made a
particular decision at least in part. 'became qf not merely 'in spite of its adverse
effects on an identifiable group." 1 " Through this definition the Court. de-
manded from the plaintiff evidence that the Massachusetts legislature origi-
nally had enacted, or subsequently preserved, the veterans' preference not
merely in spite of its adverse impact on women, but specifically because it would
so discriminate against them. Such a differentiation necessarily involves de-
termining the decisionmakers' subjective states of mind when acting on the
preference legislation. Hence, in using this because of—in spite of distinction,
the Feeney Court not only defined the level of intent. required under Davis's
discriminatory purpose standard, but also adopted a subjective intent method
as the means of proving the existence of such purposeful discrimination.'"
1 "" Id. Plaintiff's argument is based on a concept, common to both civil and
criminal law, that "[i]ntended consequences include those which (a) represent the very
purpose for which an act is done (regardless of likelihood of occurrence), or (b) arc
known to be substantially certain to result (regardless of desire)." Brief for the Appel-
lee at 33-34 (citing Perkins, A Rationale of Mew Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 911
(1939)).
101
 442 U.S. at 276. See note 49 supra for a statistical breakdown of the statute's
disproportionate impact.
Justice Stevens, concurring itt Washington v. Davis, had suggested that
larequently the most probative evidence of intent will he objective evidence of what
actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the
actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences
of his deeds. - 426 U.S. at 253. See also Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450,
459 (1969) (applying the inevitability rule in school segregation cases).
1 " Although the Davis Court imposed a discriminatory purpose standard, the
Supreme Court has never defined the exact level of legislative intent required by
Davis's holding. See text and notes at notes 219-31 infra.
L° 4
 442 U.S. at 278.
"5
 M. at 279.
1 "" Id. (emphasis added).
107 In footnote twenty-four the Court seems to place a limitation on the
applicability of this subjective intent method of proof by stating that "proof of dis-
criminatory intent must necessarily usually rely on objective factors ...." Id. at 279
n.24.
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Reviewing the additional evidence contained in the record,'" 8 the Court.
concluded that the plaintiff had been unable to meet this burden of proof,
since "nothing in the record demonstrat[ed]" that the veterans' preference was
enacted because it would keep women "in a stereotypic and predefined place
in the Massachusetts Civil Service."'"" Rather, the Court reiterated, the Mas-
sachusetts statute merely preferred veterans of either sex over non-veterans of
either sex as a means of accomplishing the worthy state goal of rewarding
people for their service in the armed forces.'" Under the rational-basis
test "` as applied by the Court. the validity of this goal and the appropriate-
ness of the statute's means were more than sufficient to protect the absolute,
lifetime preference from constitutional challenge. 112
J ustice Stevens, joined by Justice White, filed a concurring opinion in
which he agreed with the Court's holding, but expressed confusion over the
majority's formulation of its two-fold inquiry. 13 When reviewing a law that is
neutral on its face but disproportionate in its impact, Justice Stevens agreed
that it was appropriate to ensure the absence of any overt classification. Hav-
ing determined this issue, however, he found it unnecessary to question
whether the statute contained a covert classification, since this inquiry was no
different than asking whether the adverse impact of the statute reflected in-
vidious discrimination.' Irrespective of the question's phrasing, Justice Ste-
vens considered the number of male non-veterans disadvantaged by the Mas-
sachusetts veterans' preference sufficiently large to rebut any claim of gender
discrimination. This view was specifically rejected by Justices Marshall and
Brennan, in their dissent.""
I "' Id. at 279-80. Again the Court stated that the statutory history of the vet-
erans' preference demonstraled Ihat any person who was a veteran enjoyed the benefit
of the act, and that the definition of the veteran class had been expanded to include
women who had served in the military. Id. at 270. See text and note at note 64 supra.
Additionally, the Court briefly addressed plaintiff's contention that the legislative and
administrative history revealed that discriminatory assumptions about the suitable roles
of women had influenced the legislative choice of providing an absolute, lifetime pref-
erence. The Court summarily dismissed this argument by stating that the history of
the statute defeated such a claim by demonstrating that Massachusetts had both in-
cluded military women within the scope of the preference and recognized the con-
tribution of women to the nation's military efforts. Id. at 280 n.27.
"9 Id. at 279.
"° Id. at 280.
"' Sec text and note at note 146 irrfra.
"2 442 U.S. at 280-81.
" 3 Id. at. 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"4 Id.
"5 Id. Justice Stevens reasoned that the number of males (1,867,000) disadvan-
taged by the Massachusetts veterans' preference was sufficiently close to the number of
females (2,954,000) disadvantaged by the statute to "refute the claim" of gender dis-
crimination. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Although recognizing the relevance of the
substantial number of men disadvantaged by the veterans' preference, Justices Marshall
and Brennan thought it equally important to note that only 0.8% of women are vet-
erans; whereas, 47% of Massachusetts men achieve veteran status. Id. at 286 n.3 (Mar-
shall and Brennan, J J., dissenting). Because of this disparity, the dissenters contended
that the number of men denied a preference could not be dispositive of whether gen-
der discrimination had influenced the Massachusetts legislation. Id.
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B. The Feeney Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on four grounds
from the holding that the legislative choice of an absolute, lifetime veterans'
preference did not reflect gender-based discrimination.'" As a starting point,
Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's logic that the primary benevo-
lent purpose of the veterans' statute foreclosed the possibility of a subsidiary
objective to disadvantage women."' In support of this view, Marshall relied
upon the Court's decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.,'" which acknowledged that legislators frequently seek to
accomplish multiple goals and are rarely motivated by a single concern.'"
Given this reality, Justice Marshall reasoned that the presence of a dominant.,
legitimate purpose could not., by itself, exclude the possibility of an uncon-
stitutional subsidiary objective. Justice Marshall stressed that the appropriate
inquiry was not whether an illicit consideration was the causative reason for
enacting the statute, but rather whether it was a motivating factor in shaping
otherwise legitimate legislation.""
Finding the majority's analysis incomplete, the dissenters attempted to
discern whether a collateral discriminatory purpose had influenced the Mas-
sachusetts preference legislation. In conducting this inquiry, Justice Marshall
criticized a second aspect of the majority's opinion—the requirement of estab-
lishing the legislators' "because of" subjective intent.' 2 ' Warning that evi-
dence of a decisionmaker's subjective intentions was neither reliable nor avail-
able, Justice Marshall underscored the necessity of relying on inferences ob-
tained from objective evidence.' 22 For this reason Justice Marshall stated, the
Court had typically considered the "degree, inevitability, and foreseeability of
any disproportionate impact as well as the alternatives reasonably available"
when evaluating the purposes underlying a facially neutral law. 21 3 Applying
this analysis to the facts of Feeney, the dissent contended that the exclusionary
impact of the absolute preference followed not just foreseeably but "inexora-
bly" from the military's enrollment and advancement restrictions.'" Hence,
relying on the Court's recent decision in Castaneda v. Partida,' 25 Justice Mar-
shall argued that the foreseeable adverse result, caused by preferring a group
pre-defined as 98% male, shifted the burden to the state to establish that no
gender-based consideration had influenced the legislative choice.' 26 The state
would be unable to meet this burden, Justice Marshall reasoned, since the
statutory history of the veterans' act revealed that the law's operation had
"" Id. at 281-82 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
117
 Id. at 282.
1 " 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
"" Id. at 265.
12" 442 U.S. at 282-83.
121 Id. at 283.
122 Id.
123
 Id.
124 Id.
1215
 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
12 " 442 U.S. at 284.
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been exempted from jobs "especially calling for women." ' 27 This exemption,
coupled with the absolute preference itself, resulted in a two-tier civil service
system with women occupying lower-level secretarial jobs and men holding
more responsible and remunerative positions.'" Given the state's attempt to
mitigate the statute's impact only with respect to traditional female jobs, Jus-
tice Marshall criticized the majority's holding that "nothing in the record
evinces a collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined
place in the Massachusetts Civil Service." 129 Instead, he concluded that the
statutory scheme of the veterans' preference reflected and perpetuated the
very kind of discriminatory assumptions about the role of women which the
Court previously had held invalid.' 3 °
Concluding that the relegation of women to traditional subservient posi-
tions would prevent the state from rebutting the presumption of gender dis-
crimination, the dissenters would have subjected the veterans' statute to an
intermediate level of review."' Under this standard, the veterans' act could
be sustained only if the means by which it. benefittecl veterans were substan-
tially related to important governmental objectives.' 32 While acknowledging
the validity of the statute's three stated goals, Justice Marshall argued that the
absolute form of the veterans' preference was not substantially related to any
of these objectives. 133 With respect to the first goal, easing a veteran's transi-
tion to civilian life,' 34 he contended that the lifetime preference was clearly
too broad, since it benefitted all veterans irrespective of their date of dis-
charge. 15 The statute's second objective, encouraging military enlistment, 736
was even less plausible since there was no showing that the possibility of ob-
taining a civil service position upon discharge actually induced people to enter
the armed forces.'" Even the statute's last goal, rewarding veterans,'" was
insufficient to justify the statute's absolute and permanent form, since alterna-
tive, more limited hiring preferences could accomplish this same purpose
127 Id. at 284-85.
In Id.
129 Id. at 285-86.
1 " Id. at 285.
' 3 ' Id. at 286.
12 Id. Statutes that reflect gender-based discrimination are subjected to a more
relaxed judicial scrutiny than are statutes suspected of discrimination on the basis of
race, alienage, or national origin. See text and note at note 152 infra. In Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court established that "[do withstand constitutional
challenge, ... classifications by gender must serve important govertunental objectives
and must be substantially related to those objectives." Id. at I97.
' 33 442 U.S. at 286.
' 34 In 'support of the absolute preference, Massachusetts advanced three gov-
ernmental objectives: (1) assisting veterans in their readjustment to civilian life; (2)
encouraging patriotic service [military enlistment]; and (3) rewarding those who have
sacrificed in the service of their country. See Brief for the Appellants at 24, Personnel
Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). See generally Hutcheson v. Di-
rector of Civil Serv., 3fi1 Mass. 480, 281 N.E.2d 53 (1972).
133 442 U.S. at 286.
'" See note 134 supra.
137
 442 U.S. at 287.
138 Sec note 134 supra.
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without foreclosing the public employment opportunities of women.'" For
these reasons, the dissent concluded that the Massachusetts absolute veterans'
preference violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'" Before considering whether this conclusion is indeed correct, the
following critique will examine the validity of the majority's analytic approach.
11. CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
Since the Massachusetts veterans' preference was neutral on its face but
disproportionate in its impact, the Feeney Court formulated a two-step inquiry.
The Court thought it necessary to question first whether the law was truly
neutral in the sense that it contained neither an overt nor a covert gender
classification. If the Court held the statute to be neutral in fact, then it would
analyze the law in accordance with the analysis and holding in Washington v.
Davis."' Under this second inquiry, the Feeney Court questioned whether the
statute's disproportionate impact on women reflected an invidious dis-
criminatory purpose.
Focusing on the issue of classification, the following critique questions the
validity of the Court's two-step inquiry. The nature and function of overt and
covert classifications first will be discussed. It will be submitted that a three-
step analysis is necessary to determine the existence of these classifications.
Applying this three-step test to the Massachusetts veterans' preference, it will
be demonstrated that the identification of a covert classificiation is itself de-
pendent upon a determination of discriminatory purpose. Finally, since the
subject of the Court's first inquiry—covert classifications—is itself dependent
upon the topic of the second inquiry—discriminatory purpose—it will be
concluded that the Feeney Court misformulated its two-step analysis.
A. First Inquiry: Overt or Covert Classification
I. Traditional Equal Protection Analysis
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
each individual equal protection under the law.' 42 While this guarantee may
he stated simply, it becomes complicated in practice since laws must categorize
' 39 442 U.S. at 287-88. Specifically, Justice Marshall mentioned the limited point
preferences used by the majority of the states and the federal government. As an
alternative, justice Marshall suggested limiting the Massachusetts absolute, lifetime
preference to a specific duration of time so that. veterans might still be rewarded, but
women would not be excluded from the best civil service positions. Id.
442 U.S. at 288.
'" 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
142 The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part that "No state shall ...
deny to any person in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV, § 1. A law is equal when it treats similarly situated persons in the same
manner. There is, however, no requirement that a law identically treat persons in
dissimilar positions. Hence, while equal protection under the laws is guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment, equal results from the laws is not. See generally Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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individuals, distinguishing between those within and without their reach.
Given this reality, the Supreme Court has stated that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not strip the states of their power
to classify individuals; 143
 rather it commands that these statutory classifica-
tions be reasonable.'" Evaluating the reasonableness of a challenged classifi-
cation is, therefore, the central aim of the traditional equal protection
analysis.'
Under this analysis, most classifications rationally related to a reasonable
governmental objective are presumed valid. 14 " If, however, a law involves
identifiable minority groups traditionally the targets of discrimination and
disadvantage, the Court is far more skeptical of the statute's purported pur-
pose.'" Hence, any statute explicitly distinguishing individuals on the basis of
their race, 148
 alienage,"" national origin,'" or gender 151 is said to erect an
143 See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976)
(per curiam).
"4 The reasonableness of a classification is measured by a means-end analysis.
See generally G. GUNTHER, CoNsmarrioNAL LAW 665-90 (1975). If the statutory classifi-
cation, or means, is sufficiently related to the laWs purpose, or end, then the classifica-
tion is deemed reasonable. Id. Since the degree of congruence actually required varies
with respect to the group being classified, the Court has developed three standards of
review, or "means tests," by which to measure the validity of a challenged classification.
See text and notes at notes 146-52 infra. For the classic discussion of the doctrine of
reasonable classification. see Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection qf the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. Rev. 341 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Tussman and tcnBroek].
" 5 See generally Tussman and tenBrock, supra note 144.
See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 665-90 (1975). While wholly
arbitrary overt classifications arc forbidden under this basic test, any overt classification
rationally related to a reasonable governmental objective is sustained. In Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), the Court discussed this minimal ra-
tionality standard as follows: "The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not take from the State the power In classify, ... but admits of the exercise
of a wide scope of discretion in this regard, and avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis and therefore purely arbitrary." Id. at 78.
117 united States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(justice Stone forecast in 1938 that a stricter judicial scrutiny would be required if a
"discrete and insular" minority were the target of legislative discrimination).
"8 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial segregation held
invalid); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. I (19(18) (state miscegenation laws held uncon-
stitutional). When originally adopted, the primary aim of the fourteenth amendment
was the elimination of racial discrimination. Hence, an explicit statutory distinction
based on race is the paradigm suspect classification.
149 In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), justice Blackmun an-
nounced that "aliens as a class arc a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority
... for whom such heightened solicitude is appropriate." Id. at 372. See also Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). While classifications based upon alienage made by
state governments are considered suspect, such classifications made by the federal gov-
ernment are not. Cf. Mathers v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (upholding a federal
medicare statute giving some aliens benefits and denying them to others).
' 5 ° See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948); Hirabayashi v.
United States. 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality.").
1 .' See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1979) (since a statutory scheme
provides that different treatment be accorded individuals on the basis of their sex, "it
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overt discriminatory classification. Since these overt classifications are pre-
sumed to result from purposeful discrimination, each triggers a heightened
standard of review under which the state must establish the validity of its
purpose and the reasonableness of its classification.'"
Although the most obvious equal protection violations involve overt clas-
sifications, the Court has recognized that discriminatory classifications can also
be concealed within the law itself.'" Unfortunately, however, the Court has
never explicitly defined the role which these "covert" classifications play in the
equal protection analysis. Nevertheless, close analysis of Guinn v. United
States,' 54 reveals that an important difference exists between the function of
an overt classification in creating a presumption of discrimination and the role
of a covert classification, which can itself be identified only after purposeful
discrimination has been established.
thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.").
See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
"2 Classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin are, in the Court's
view, suspect and presumptively discriminatory. The mere presence of an overt sus-
pect classification triggers strict judicial scrutiny. In Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), the Court announced:
¶A111 legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny. Pressing public policy may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.
Id. at '216. Under this standard of review, the state can rebut the presumption of
discrimination only by establishing that the statute furthers a compelling state interest
by the least restrictive alternative.
Like minority groups, women have also been the victims of historical discrimina-
tion. Justice Brennan, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). compared the
19th-century position of women in the United States to that of blacks under the pre-
Civil War slave codes:
Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit
in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the
legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardian of
their own children.... lAlnd although blacks were guaranteed the vote in
1870, women were denied even that right—which is itself "preservative of
other basic and civil and political rights"—until adoption of the Nineteenth
Amendment half a century later.
Id. at 685. A majority of the Court, however; while recognizing that explicit gender
classifications should trigger some heightened standard of review, has never agreed
that such classifications are suspect and, thus, deserving of the strictest judicial
scrutiny. Instead, the Court has developed a third, intermediate standard of review to
measure the validity of gender-based distinctions. As Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), firmly established, "classifications by gender must serve important governmen-
tal objectives and must be substantially related to those objectives." Id. at 197. See also
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
153 See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (the fifteenth amendment "nul-
lifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination."). Cf. Gornillion
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (discovering the existence of covert discrimination,
not covert classification); Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discriminatory
application).
"4 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
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In Guinn, the Court considered the validity of a 1909 amendment to Ok-
lahoma's state constitution.'" This amendment, while imposing a literacy test
as a condition to voting, contained a "grandfather" clause which exempted
from the literacy requirement any person, or "lineal descendant of such ...
person who was, on January I, 1866, or anytime prior thereto, entitled to
vote."'" The Court's evaluation of this provision entailed three distinct steps.
Initially, in considering the explicit language of the amendment, the Court
stated that there were "no express words" classifying people on the basis of
race.'" The Court thus concluded that the Oklahoma amendment did not
erect an overt racial classification. Turning next to the amendment's actual
operation, the Court observed that the grandfather clause "inherently brings
that result into existence" since it related back to January I, 1866, a period of
time when most blacks did not have the right to vote. 158 Hence, the Court
reasoned, while the amendment seemingly imposed a literacy test on all per-
sons, the grandfather clause exempted whites from this requirement, and,
thus, applied the literacy standard only to blacks.''• Having uncovered a clas-
sification incorporated within the Oklahoma amendment, the Court next
searched for the purpose behind choosing the 1866 date. "Unable to discover
... the slightest reason for basing the classification upon a period of time
prior to the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment," the Court concluded
that the real purpose of Oklahoma's state amendment was to deny blacks the
right to vote.t"o
By unmasking this intentionally concealed discriminatory purpose, the
Court revealed that the Oklahoma amendment contained a covert racial clas-
sification, and thus violated the fifteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution."' Unlike overt classifications, which are immediately apparent
from the statutory language, the Guinn Court's identification of a covert clas-
sification depended in part upon its determination Ihat the purpose underly-
ing the amendment was discriminatory. This critical difference in analysis be-
tween identifying an overt classification and discovering a covert classification
"5 Id. at 356-57.
156
 The amendment provided:
No person shall be registered as an elector of this State or be allowed to
vote in any elecoion herein, unless he be able to read and write any section
of the constitution of the State of Oklahoma; but no person who was, on
January 1, 1866, or at anytime prior thereto, entitled to vote under any
form of government, or who at that time resided in some foreign nation,
and no lineal descendant of such person, shall be denied the right to regis-
ter and vote because of his inability to so read and write sections of such
constitution.
Id. at 357.
"7 Id. at 364.
158
 Id. at 364-65.
' 59 Id. at 365.
181' Id.
1 " Id. The fifteenth amendment provides that "[1]he right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1.
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defines the role which each classification plays in the equal protection analysis.
Easily apparent overt classifications provide a starting point for the Court's
equal protection inquiry by creating a presumption of purposeful discrimina-
tion. In contrast, a finding of purposeful discrimination is first necessary to
uncover the existence of a covert classification. Hence, rather than marking
the starting point of the Court's search for purposeful discrimination, the
identification of a covert classification instead signals the end of the Court's
analysis. Although the distinction between the function of an overt classifica-
tion and the less significant role of a covert classification may seem unimpor-
tant, the following suggested analysis of the Massachusetts veterans' prefer-
ence reveals that the differentiation at times can be critical.
2. The Three-Step Analysis Applied
A specific three-step test can be derived from the Guinn Court's analysis
of the Oklahoma consitutional amendment. First, the Court. examined the ex-
press statutory language to determine if the amendment established an overt
racial classification."2 Next, the Court scrutinized the inherent structure of
the amendment. to determine if it. contained a concealed classification.' 63 Fi-
nally, the Court questioned whether this classification had been purposefully
incorporated within the amendment.. 1114
Applying the Guinn Court's three-step analysis to the Massachusetts abso-
lute preference reveals distinct similarities and differences between the vet-
erans' statute and the Oklahoma amendment. Initially, it is apparent from a
consideration of the explicit language used in the veterans' act that the Mas-
sachusetts law contains "no express words" distinguishing men from women.
The statute merely provides that veterans shall be given preference over
non-veterans in attaining civil service positions."5 Thus, like the Oklahoma
amendment, the veterans' preference does not establish an overt classification.
The absence of an overt classification does not, however, preclude the possi-
bility that the Massachusetts statute contains a concealed gender classification.
In fact, just as the grandfather clause incorporated the results of prior dis-
crimination against blacks, so does the absolute preference by its necessary
operation embody the military's past discrimination against women."6 The
military's enrollment quota resulted in an armed forces personnel consisting
of 98% men and 2% worsen."'' As judge Campbell correctly observed, this
classification was necessarily built into the absolute preference since only those
"2 238 U.S. 347, 364 (1915).
163 Id. at 364-65.
"4 Id. at 365.
See note 2 supra.
166 Since the Massachusetts veterans' preference is both absolute and perma-
nent, the results of the military's discrimination are actually "frozen" into the statute,
thus eliminating women from consideration for civil service positions. Under the lim-
ited hiring techniques, although the military's past practices preclude women from
being preferred, many female applicants still have access to civil service positions by
virtue of their high composite test scores.
1 " 7 Sec note 33 supra.
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allowed entrance to the military could attain the preferred veteran status and,
thus, be considered for appointment to the best civil service positions."'
Although the concealed classification formed by the interaction of the
Massachusetts veterans' statute with the military's discriminatory practices is
technically neutral in that a few women can attain the preferred veteran
status, this formal neutrality should make no difference for equal protection
purposes.'"`' The equal protection clause commands that. classifications be
reasonable.'" If the handful of women allowed entry to the military could
equalize an otherwise discriminatory classification, the equal protection
guarantee would be meaningless. Thus, the Massachusetts veterans' prefer-
ence should be deemed, like the Oklahoma amendment, to contain an inhe-
rent concealed classification.
Finally, the question whether this concealed classification was purpose-
fully incorporated within the Massachusetts veterans' preference must be con-
sidered. At this final point of inquiry, the veterans' law and the Oklahoma
amendment critically differ. While not even the "slightest [valid] reason" could
be discerned for choosing the 1866 literacy standard,in the Massachusetts ab-
solute preference does promote a primary, legitimate purpose—rewarding
veterans.' 72
 Hence, a plausible rationale for adopting an absolute form of
hiring preference that freezes the military's past discrimination into Mas-
sachusetts law can be advanced. Nevertheless, as dissenting justices Marshall
and Brennan observed, the mere existence of a dominant legitimate purpose
cannot, by itself, foreclose the possibility of a collateral discriminatory objec-
tive.'" Thus the dispositive question becomes whether the Massachusetts
legislature attempted to benefit its veterans by accomplishing the subsidiary
objective of discriminating against women. On one hand, if such a dis-
criminatory purpose influenced the Massachusetts legislation, the veterans'
statute will be deemed to contain a covert gender classification. 174 If, on the
other hand, no discriminatory purpose affected the Massachusetts decision-
makers' choice, the actual incorporation of the military's past discrimination
against women will be deemed a mere incident of accomplishing a worthy
state objective. Absent purposeful discrimination, therefore, the veterans'
preference, although embodying an inherent gender classification, will be
held not to contain a covert gender classification under the Guinn three-step
test.
Presumably because purposeful discrimination dictates whether a con-
cealed classification is covert or not, Justice Stevens, concurring in Feeney,
stated that no real difference existed between asking whether the Mas-
sachusetts veterans' preference contained a covert gender classification and
I 7" See text at notes 117-20 supra.
'" See text at notes 160-61 supra.
17"
 See text and notes at notes 142-55 supra.
171 See text at note 160 supra.
"2 See note 134 supra.
supra .
1
 Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. at 151. See also text at notes 80-81
1 itr' See Fleming & Shamir, supra note 4, at 21-22.
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questioning whether the statute resulted from purposeful discrimination.' 75
As will be seen, the Feeney majority's apparent failure to understand this simi-
larity when formulating its two-step inquiry led, in part., to the Court's repeti-
tive and disorderly opinion.
3. The Two-Step Approach in Feeney
Contrasting the foregoing three-step analysis with the Feeney majority's
two-step inquiry reveals defects implicit in the Court's formulation of its
analytical approach. Unlike the three-step analysis, the analytical approach
formulated by the Feeney majority contained only two independent inquiries.
The Feeney Court. First considered whether the veterans' statute contained an
overt or a covert classification.'" • Only after answering this question did the
Court deem it necessary to consider whether a discriminatory purpose had
influenced the veterans' preference legislation.'" The formulation of this
twofold inquiry contains two misleading defects. By isolating the covert clas-
sification question in the first inquiry from the role of purposeful legislative
discrimination in the second inquiry, the Court indicated that these issues
could be determined independently. Yet as already demonstrated,' 78
 uncover-
ing a covert classification necessarily depends upon a finding of purposeful
discrimination. Conversely, by coupling the overt and covert issues within the
same inquiry, the Court. implied that these classifications perform similar
functions within the equal protection analysis. As previously discussed, how-
ever, overt classifications create a presumption of discrimination, thus signal-
ing the starting point of the Court's heightened scrutiny.' 79 In contrast,
covert classifications are not finally identified until the end of the Court's
analysis, after a discriminatory purpose has been uncovered. A statute
175
 442 U.S. al 281 (Stevens, J., concurring). Sec text and notes at notes 113-15
supra. If extended, Justice Stevens' observation could bring necessary clarity to the
untraditional equal protection analysis applied to facially neutral laws which result in
disparate impacts. As the Feeney decision demonstrates, undue significance is currently
placed On the discovery of covert classifications. See text and notes at notes 176-87
infra. This result may be the product of two factors. First, as previously discussed, the
importance of overt discriminatory classifications in the traditional equal protection
analysis has led to the misformulation of the function of covert classifications in the
disproportionate impact context. See text and notes at notes 142-61 supra. Further,
and perhaps the major source of confusion, the courts have failed to realize that a
statute containing a covert classification is simply a facially neutral law whose dispro-
portionate impact is produced by a discriminatory purpose. Once this fact is realized,
the fundamental judicial inquiry, when examining a facially neutral statute, will be
forcefully identified as a search for discriminatory purpose and not the discovery of a
covert . classification. Moreover, in conducting this analysis, it should become apparent
to the courts that the catalytic role of overt classifications in creating a presumption of
discrimination is most closely approximated, not by that of covert classifications, but by
the function which disproportionate impact performs in providing the "important
starling point" for the search of purposeful discrimination. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
' 7" 442 U.S. at 274. Sec text at notes 47-52 supra.
'7 442 U.S. at 274.
'" See text at notes 160-61 supra and text following note 161 supra.
' 7" See text following note 161 supra.
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containing a covert classification, therefore, may be characterized as simply a
facially neutral law whose disproportionate impact is produced by a
discriminatory purpose. For this reason the Feeney Court was mistaken in
formulating.its two-step approach since it considered the question of covert
classification independently from the issue of discriminatory purpose.
Compounding the confusion created by these conceptual inaccuracies, the
Feeney Court misapplied its own analytical formula. By positing its two-step
approach as two independent and alternative inquiries, the Court indicated
that it would consider the classification questions first, and then, if necessary,
would discern the purposes underlying the preference legislation.'" In appli-
cation, however, the Court did the opposite. In conducting the first phase of
its analysis, the Feeney Court questioned whether the veterans' statute con-
tained a covert gender classification."' Rather than examine the inherent op-
eration of [he absolute preference, however, the Court discussed the statute's
purpose and its impact.'" Presumably, these considerations were more ap-
propriate in the second phase of its two-step inquiry."3
Apart from the disjointed nature of this inquiry, the Court's analysis itself
was superficial. Satisfied that the legitmacy of the act's primary purpose fore-
closed the possibility of a covert gender classification, the Court. never ad-
dressed the dispositive issue of whether a collateral discriminatory purpose
had influenced the legislature's choice of means. In order to explain the stat-
ute's adverse impact in a neutral fashion, the Court merely restated the fact
that women comprised only 2% of armed forces personnel. This, however,
begged the real question of whether the absolute preference contained a pur-
posefully concealed covert classification by virtue of its interaction with the
military's enrollment. quota." 4
18"
 442 U.S. at 274. Specifically, justice Stewart stated: "The first question is
whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender
based. If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender, the second
question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination."
Id.
"1 Id.
'H 2 Initially, the Court determined that the veterans' preference contained no
express words [being neutral on its face] distinguishing between men and women, and
thus did not erect an overt gender classification. Id. at 274. Then, relying in part on
the district court's two central findings that the Massachusetts preference served a
worthy purpose, and was not established for the purpose of discriminating against
women, the Court concluded that the veterans' statute was "not. a pretext. for gender
discrimination." Id. at 274-75. Having noted the primary legitimate purpose of the
veterans' statute, the Court next turned to the law's impact, explaining that the adverse
effect on women could actually he explained on neutral grounds. Id. at 275. Finally,
the Court concluded that. the legitimate purpose of the veterans' act provided the
"surest explanation for its impact." Id. See text at notes 54-71 supra.
"3 See note 180 supra.
' 4
 442 U.S. at 275. The Court noted that. Massachusetts' definition of veteran
was neutral as to gender. Since the military's enrollment quota had already established
an armed forces personnel ratio of 98% men and 2% women, however, the actual
neutrality of Massachusetts' definition of veteran is not dispositive of whether the vet-
erans' statute contains a discriminatory classification.
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Having never truly investigated whether the Massachusetts statute con-
tained a covert classification, the Court next turned to the second part of its
two-step inquiry, and considered whether a discriminatory purpose had
shaped the preference legislation.'" Ironically, the first question addressed
and rejected by the Court involved plaintiff's contention that the veterans' act
was inherently non-neutral,' 86 an argument more appropriately analyzed
under the Court's first inquiry. By considering the purpose underlying the
absolute preference in its first inquiry, and the inherent structure of the vet-
erans' statute in the second, the Feeney Court not only misapplied its two-step
analysis, but also reversed the logical order of determining the existence of
covert classification as already demonstrated through explanation of the
Guinn Court's three-step treatment. The Feeney Court's misformulation and
misapplication of its analytical approach resulted in a seemingly illogical and
incomplete opinion, since the Court continually appeared to be using the
wrong analysis to determine whether the Massachusetts statute contained a
covert gender classification. This result may have been caused by the Court's
failure to truly appreciate the hybrid nature of a covert classification. It is
more likely, however, that the superficial treatment given the classification
issue stems from a belief that the veterans' statute is simply a neutral law with
a disproportionate impact, thus deserving analysis in accordance with the
purposeful discrimination standard developed in Washington v. Davis.'"
B. Second Inquiry: Existence of Purposeful Gender Discrimination
The Supreme Court in Feeney treated the Massachusetts absolute prefer-
ence as a neutral law which disproportionately excludes women from public
employment positions. This treatment entailed a two-step extension of the
Washington v. Davis holding. First, the Court extended the purposeful dis-
crimination reqUirement developed in the racial context of Davis to the gen-
der issue raised in Feeney.'" Second, in fashioning a subjective "because
of—in spite of distinction to differentiate allowable from unconstitutional
legislative motivation, the Feeney Court explicitly defined the level of intent
required under Davis's discriminatory purpose standard.'" Focusing on both
aspects of the Court's two-step extension, the following critique first questions
the applicability of Davis's purposeful discrimination standard to the gender
issue involved in the Feeney case. An examination of the holding and rationale
of the Davis decision will demonstrate that in measuring the constitutionality
of the veterans' statute the Feeney Court should have applied a two-prong
185 442 U.S. at 276.
188 Id. at 276-78. The plaintiff had argued that the absolute veterans' prefer-
ence statute incorporated the military's historical discrimination against women and,
therefore, was structurally non-neutral. See text and notes at notes 77-81 supra. Under
the alternative analysis suggested in this casenote, at text and notes at notes 162-75
supra, this contention represents a question of classification, inherent to the statute
itself. If such a classification is found "concealed" within the statute, then the appro-
priate inquiry involves whether this result was purposefully or coincidentally produced.
187 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
188
 442 U.S. at 273-74.
185
 Id. at 279.
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standard. Initially the Court should have asked whether the law's adverse im-
pact reflected purposeful discrimination. Additionally, the Court should have
determined whether the adverse effect resulted from the influence of archaic
gender assumptions on the legislative decision to adopt and preserve the abso-
lute veterans' preference. After concluding that the Court improperly ex-
tended Davis's holding to the Feeney case, the final section of this casenote will
critique the Court's definition of the level of intent required to satisfy Davis's
discriminatory purpose standard.
I. Extension of Davis's Discriminatory Purpose Standard
In Washington v. Davis, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
written personnel test administered by the District of Columbia Police De-
partment to screen prospective police officers. 190 Although neutral on its
face, the personnel test excluded a disproportionate number of black appli-
cants, and thus was challenged as discriminating on the basis of race.' 9 ' Al-
though acknowledging that "disproportionate impact [was] not irrelevant," 192
the Davis Court stated that impact alone was insufficient to trigger a
heightened standard of review.' 93 Rather, the Court announced that the dis-
proportionate impact of an otherwise neutral law must be traced to an under-
lying "purpose or intent" to discriminate.'" If established, this purposeful
discrimination would require strict judicial scrutiny.'"
In adopting this discriminatory purpose standard, the Davis Court ap-
pears to have been concerned with protecting from invalidation wholly inno-
cent laws which "in practice benefit or burden one race more than
another." ' 96 The Court warned that if the validity of such statutes were mea-
sured by a result standard, rather than by a standard requiring evidence of
illicit legislative intent, "a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulat-
ory, and licensing statutes" could be declared unconstitutional.'" Presumably
to avoid this result, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the equal protec-
tion clause guarantees equality under the law, but not equal results from the
19 ° 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976).
191 Id. at 236.
192 Id. at 242.
193 Id. Justice White stated:
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends other-
wise within the power of the government to pursue, is invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion
of one race than another. Disaproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it
is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule, ... that racial
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable
only by the weightiest of considerations.
Id.
' 94 Id. at 240.
195 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 264-66 (1977).
426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
197 Id.
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law." 8
 The basic concept expressed through this construction, and implicit in
the Davis Court's protective rationale, is that a condition offensive to the
constitution—including, but not necessarily limited to, purposeful
discrimination—must be established before a neutral statute with unequal re-
sults deserves a heightened standard of review. This rationale is broad
enough to justify heightened judicial scrutiny of a statute with disproportion-
ate results produced by any unconstitutional consideration. The holding in
Davis was limited to a discriminatory purpose because, in the racial context,
that was the single consideration which violated the constitution.'" As the
Davis Court emphasized, a purpose or intent to discriminate is the one "dif-
ferentiating factor" between allowable and impermissible state action. 20 ° Con-
sequently, the Davis Court developed a single discriminatory purpose stan-
dard and held that the racially disproportionate impact of a facially neutral
law must he traced to an underlying discriminatory purpose: 2 "i
The extent to which this single discriminatory purpose standard should
be transferred from the racial context of Davis to the gender context of
Feeney, depends on whether a legislative discriminatory purpose is the only
condition which constitutes invidious gender discrimination, thus violating the
constitution. Gender discrimination, however, has been found to include more
than a conscious legislative intent to discriminate against. womcn. 202 The Su-
preme Court previously has recognized that women arc caught in a circular
trap.'" Their history of subordination in this country has fostered false pre-
sumptions concerning the suitable role of women in society. This inaccurate
role stereotyping has perpetuated the exclusion of women from many business,
professional, and employment positions. 2 " These exclusions in turn reinforce
the archaic notions about the role of women. Writing for a plurality of the Court
in Frontiero v. Richardson,' Justice Brennan observed that "as a result" of this
process "our statute books Care] laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions be-
tween the sexes [which] . often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status." 20" For this reason, the Court
has held in several cases that a statutory classification based on overbroad and
"" In Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548 (1972), the Court rejected a
claim of racial discrimination based solely on a law's disparate results because the ac-
ceptance of this "theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among the
grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the
treatment might be. - Id. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hons.
Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977).
1"" See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205 (1973), where the Court
stated that the "essential element" of unconstitutional segregation is "intentional state
action." Id.
2" 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
2" Id. at 239-45.
2 " See text and notes at notes 203-14 infra.
2 " See Justice Brennan's discussion, in Frontier() v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
685 (1973), of the 19th-century position of women, at note 152 supra.
214
 See generally Blumberg, supra note 3, at 52-56; Fleming & Shanor, supra note
4, at 36-42.
2" '' 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
20" Id. at 685-87.
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archaic assumptions about the dependent role of women constitutes invidious
gender discrim i nation ." 7
In Reed v. Reed, 2 " for example, the Court rejected the contention that
women still are not engaged in politics, the professions, business or industry
to the extent that men are,"'" and invalidated an Idaho statute which gave
preference to men over women in the appointment of an estate adminis-
trator.210 Similarly, in Frontiero v. Richardson, 211
 the Court invalidated a stat-
ute which required only servicewomen to establish the dependency of their
spouses before receiving fringe benefits. 212 Finally, in Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 213
 the Court struck down a provision of the Social Security Act which was
based on a presumption that women would not contribute to their families'
financial support. The Court emphasized that such "archaic and overbroad
generalizations [can] not [be] tolerated under the Constitution. " 214 Con-
sequently, while a legislative purpose to discriminate is the one, specific condi-
tion which violates the constitution in a racial context, the Court has defined
both intentional discrimination and the influence of overbroad gender as-
sumptions as factors offending the constitution in gender cases. Given these
dual conditions, Davis's single discriminatory purpose standard is an insuffi-
cient measure of unconstitutional gender considerations since it would deter-
mine only if the legislature had acted with a purpose to discriminate against
women, and would not uncover whether inherently discriminatory assump-
tions about the role of women had shaped the challenged legislation.
This specific shortcoming is clearly demonstrated by the facts of Feeney.
The most unbiased reconstruction of the legislative state of mind when the
Massachusetts veterans' preference was enacted in 1896 would reveal not an
intent to disadvantage women, but rather a presumption that women either
would not or should not compete with men for civil service positions. This
nineteenth century view of women's proper place is reflected in the following
excerpt of Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in the 1873 decision of Brad-
well v. State: 215
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The con-
stitution of the family organization ... as well as the nature of things
indicates the domestic sphere as that properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony ... of interests and
views which belong ... to the family institution is repugnant to the
idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career .... 216
217
 See text and notes at notes 208-14 infra.
"8
 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
"" See the Supreme Court discussion of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in
Frontier() v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973).
2 "
211
212
213
404 U.S. 71,
411 U.S. 677
411 U.S. 677,
420 U.S. 636
76-77 (1971).
(1973).
690-91	 (1973).
(1975).
214 Id. at 643. See also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975).
212
 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
2 l Id. at 141.
1138	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 2i:1110
The view that women are suited for only certain types of jobs is also reflected
in Brown v. Russell, 217
 an 1896 decision in which the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court sustained an early form of the absolute veterans' preference
and stated "Iwlhen women are to be appointed, there is a satisfactory reason
in the nature of the office or employment why this should be done."'S Since
these discriminatory assumptions probably shaped the Massachusetts legisla-
tive choice in adopting an absolute veterans' preference, their perpetuation
alone would be sufficient, under a two-prong standard, to produce a gender
classification which then triggers a heightened standard of review. Under the
single discriminatory purpose standard as applied by the Feeney Court, how-
ever, such assumptions have no independent significance. Rather, as the
Court's opinion demonstrates, these prior assumptions were considered only
as evidence of a specific legislative intent to discriminate against women. Al-
though this result was neither mandated by the rationale of Davis, nor consis-
tent with the conditions which constitute invidious gender discrimination, the
Feeney Court extended the holding of Davis without alteration or explanation.
Through this first extension, the Feeney Court diminished the indepen-
dent significance of the role which discriminatory gender assumptions played
in shaping the Massachusetts preference legislation. As will be seen in the fol-
lowing sections, the Feeney Court subsequently eliminated their probative
value completely. Although the Davis Court explicitly adopted a discrimina-
tory purpose standard, it did not specify the exact level of intent which would
be deemed purposeful under this requirement. The Feeney case presented the
Court with an opportunity to discuss, and for the first time to define, the
precise levels of intent necessary to meet Davis's purposeful discrimination
standard. The following analysis initially will examine the specific facts before
the Massachusetts legislators when originally enacting and subsequently pre-
serving the Massachusetts veterans' preference. Once these facts have been
identified, it will be submitted that the Massachusetts legislators were both
aware of and indifferent to the adverse effect of the absolute veterans' pref-
erence on the public employment opportunities of most women. Finally, it will
be suggested that the Feeney Court should have adopted a level of intent
under which indifference would not be condoned.
2. Development of an Explicit Intent Rule
Initially, as the Feeney Court acknowledged, the Massachusetts legislators
could not have been "unaware that most veterans are men." 219 Thus, when
originally enacting and subsequently preserving the Massachusetts absolute
2" 166 Mass. 14, 43 N.E. 1005 (1896).
2" Id. at 17, 43 N.E. at 1007.
2" 442 U.S. at 278. The Court stated:
And it cannot seriously be argued that the Legislature of Massachusetts
could have been unaware that most veterans are men. It would thus be
disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for
women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in
the sense that they were not foreseeable.
Id.
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preference, the legislators knew they were also foreclosing the public
employment opportunities of most women. 22" Further, because of the wide-
spread use of the more moderate point and tie-breaking preferences,"' the
legislators must also have known of these less drastic alternatives which, by
virtue of their limited form, would not have eliminated women from consid-
eration for civil service positions. Moreover, as Justice Marshall demonstrated
in his dissenting opinion, these alternative hiring preferences, by offering vet-
erans a competitive headman, accomplished the three traditional goals under-
lying the preference statutes. 222
Consequently, the exclusionary impact on women resulting from the abso-
lute preference was not only appreciated by the Massachusetts legislators, 221
but was also an unnecessary consequence of furthering the statute's objec-
tives.224 Hence, by choosing and preserving an absolute and permanent vet-
erans' preference in lieu of a more limited preferential technique, the Mas-
sachusetts legislature knowingly and needlessly excluded women from the best
civil service positions. The immediate question posed by this legislative action
is not necessarily whether the Massachusetts decisionmakers subjectively de-
sired to discriminate against women, but rather whether the legislature's de-
liberate indifference to the devastating impact of an absolute preference on
women should be deemed a sufficient level of intent to satisfy Davis's pur-
poseful discrimination standard.
The Court has recognized in other areas of law that. differing levels of
intent should be treated the same for purposes of assigning legal responsibil-
ity. In New York Times v. Sullivan,'" for example, the Court held that either
actual knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth provided a
basis for imposing liability in a defamation action. 22f' Similarly, for the pur-
pose of assigning criminal responsibility, the courts have made no substantial
distinction between a subjective wish to cause harm and a total disregard as to
whether such harm occurs. 227
A similar rule of intent, which does not differentiate between a subjective
wish to cause harm and a total disregard as to whether such harm occurs,
seems particularly appropriate in the Feeney context. Since the fourteenth
2211 Id.
221 See text and notes at notes 3-8 supra.
222
 442 U.S. at 286-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
223
 Commenting on the exemption of job requisitions "especially calling for
women," Justice Marshall reasoned that "the legislative history of the statute reflects
the Commonwealth's patent appreciation of the impact the preference system would
have on women, and an equally evident desire to mitigate that impact only with re-
spect to certain traditionally female occupations." Id. at 284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
224 As Justice Marshall demonstrated in his dissent, the Massachusetts absolute
veterans' preference was not substantially related to the achievement of the statute's
three stated goals. Rather, Marshall suggested that either a point preference or a
time-limited absolute preference was sufficient in advancing the legitimate objective of
rewarding veterans. Id. at 286-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22" Id. at 279-80.
227 See 1 BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 20 (9th ed. 1939).
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amendment guarantees individuals the protection of equal laws, 228 it should
make no difference in determining the validity of a challenged statute
whether a state legislature enacted a law because of a subjective desire to dis-
criminate or from indifference as to whether such discrimination will result.
Specifically, with respect to the Massachusetts absolute veterans' preference, it
should make no difference for the purpose of satisfying Davis's intent re-
quirement whether the exclusion of women from a major sector of public
employment was a product of a legislative desire to exclude women or of
indifference to that result. Unfortunately, the Feeney Court, by fashioning a
"because of—ill spite of" distinction to define purposeful discrimination,
never directly considered whether a legislative disregard satisfied Davis's in-
tent standard.
Although never addressing whether legislative indifference should be
deemed purposeful discrimination, the Court in Feeney defined at least one
level of intent inherent in Davis's discriminatory purpose standard. In utilizing
the "because of—in spite of distinction, the Court stated that "discriminatory
purpose implies ... that ... a legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part 'because of', not merely in spite of its adverse
effects upon an identifiable [minority] group." 229 Viewed in the abstract, this
distinction appears to be valid. The term "because of connotes a specific,
subjective desire on the part of a state legislature to discriminate, an intent.
obviously prohibited by the equal protection clause. The term "in spite of
connotes a "forced" choice between two competing policy considerations, a
task specifically delegated to the legislature by the separation of powers doc-
trine. 23 °
Further, this distinction maintains its validity when applied to the basic
policy decision to reward veterans by granting them a competitive headstart in
attaining public employment. When making this decision, the legislature is
confronted with only two choices, both supported by competing policy consid-
erations. Knowing that few women will ever be able to utilize the veterans'
preference, the legislature must evaluate whether the policy furthered by re-
warding veterans outweighs the handicap inflicted upon women. If the legisla-
ture deems this policy to be more important, it will establish a preference in
spite of the adverse effect upon women.
Once this basic policy decision is made, however, the "because of—in
spite or distinction loses its applicability since the legislature no longer is
forced to choose between only two alternatives. When the Massachusetts legis-
lature decided to adopt the absolute veterans' preference, it was free to
choose among many alternative forms of hiring preferences. Hence, its choice
of a preference which would permanently exclude women from civil service
positions cannot fairly be characterized as one made "in spite or this adverse
effect, but rather must be viewed as a legislative decision made with indiffer-
ence to the discriminatory impact upon women.
22 " Sec note 142 supra.
22)
 442 U.S. at 279.
2:11' See generally P. 13uEsT, PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEcisioNmAKING 351-435
(1975).
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Precisely for these reasons, Mrs. Feeney limited her constitutional chal-
lenge to the absolute form of the Massachusetts preference, and acknow-
ledged the validity of more limited veterans' preferences."' The Feeney
Court. however, by applying its "because of—in spite of" distinction, avoided
deciding whether the Massachusetts legislature, through indifference, can
knowingly and needlessly sacrifice the employment opportunities of women in
order to benefit veterans. To the extent that the Court intended its distinction
to implicitly condone such legislative indifference, the protection guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment is diminished since such a decision permits a
legislature to knowingly sacrifice the opportunities of one identifiable group
in order to grant preferential treatment to another. 232
CONCLUSION
Although the decision in Washington v. Davis laid the foundation for the
Court's later determination in Feeney, the Court's two-step extension of the
Davis holding was not required. Concerned with protecting wholly legitimate
statutes, the Davis Court followed the accepted principle that the fourteenth
amendment. guarantees equal laws, not equal results, and held that the racially
disparate impact of a facially neutral law must he traced to an underlying
discriminatory purpose. By extending this holding without properly consider-
ing the Davis Court's rationale, the Court in Feeney ignored the Massachusetts
statute's perpetuation of discriminatory gender assumptions. In addition, by
requiring the plaintiff to prove that the Massachusetts legislature enacted the
absolute veterans' preferance specifically because it would discriminate against
women, the Court eliminated the significance of these assumptions com-
231 442 U.S. at 274.
2:32 The protection afforded by the equal protection clause is further diminished
by the subjective intent requirement adopted by the Feeney Court. See text and note at
note 107 supra. The adoption of this standard could erect an insurmountable barrier
for any plaintiff, since establishing the subjective intentions of a legislative body is
beyond the realm of practical proof. See text and notes at notes 121-23 supra. This
difficulty is created by four interrelated factors. First, absent an admission, it is nearly
impossible for a plaintiff to detertnine, much less to prove, the subjective reasons un-
derlying an individual legislator's decision. See Miller, Proof of Racially Discriminatory
Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt.
Healthy, and Williamsburg'', 12 HARV. Rev. 725, 733 (1977). Additionally,
legislators are rarely motivated by a single concern. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hons. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252. 265 (1977). Hence, even if an illicit
consideration could be determined, the plaintiff would be unable to establish the ex-
tent to which this one factor influenced the decisionmake•'s overall choice. Third, and
similarly, since every statute is a product of many different decisionmakers, each acting
for separate subjective reasons, it is impossible for a plaintiff to assign an actual intent
to the legislative body itself. See Miller, supra at 733. Finally, even if the plaintiff could
overcome these evidentiary hurdles, the government could easily produce self-serving
recitations of its own honorable intentions, thus rebutting any showing of purposeful
discrimination. In short, direct evident of subjective intent is often neither available to
the plaintiff, nor reliable from the defendant. For an excellent discussion of a flexible
model to be used by the courts in ascertaining legislative intent, see Collotta, The Role
of Circumstantial Evidence in Proving Discriminatory Intent: Developments Since Washington
v. Davis, 19 B.C. L. Rev. 795 (1978).
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pletely, and allowed the legislature to consciously disregard the occurrence of
needless gender discrimination.
This combined effect following the Feeney Court's two-step extension of
Davis serves perhaps as the most compelling reason for choosing a different
approach. By ignoring the influence of discriminatory gender assumptions
and by requiring the plaintiff to establish the specific subjective intent of the
Massachusetts legislature, the Feeney Court actually transformed Davis's origi-
nal objective to protect wholly innocent statutes from invalidation into a
shield, sheltering illicit considerations from a heightened standard of review.
Realistically, this result should not be viewed as a development of constitu-
tional doctrine, since the equal protection clause commands the Court to
scrutinize, not to ignore, discriminatory factors. Nor, for this same reason,
should the two-step extension used by the Feeney Court be applied to other
gender discrimination cases. Rather, Feeney should be isolated as a veterans'
preference case, and the Court's superficial review of the evidence should be
viewed as a product of its decision that the legislature and not the courts
should control the method by which veterans are rewarded for their ser-
vice.'"
CONSTANCE A. BROWNE
233
 In his concluding statement in Feeney, justice Stewart remarked:
Veterans' hiring preferences represent an awkward—and, many argue,
unfair—exception to the widely shared view that merit and merit alone
should prevail in the employment policies of government. After a war,
such laws have been enacted virtually without opposition. During
peacetime, they inevitably have come to be viewed in many quarters as
undemocratic and unwise. Absolute and permanent preferences, as the
troubled history of this law demonstrates, have always been subject to the
objection that they give the veteran more than a square deal.... The sub-
stantial edge granted to veterans by [the Massachusetts absolute pre-
ference] may reflect unwise policy. The appellee, however, has simply
failed to demonstrate that the law in any way reflects a purpose to dis-
criminate ....
442 U.S. at 280-81.
